DanielMa wrote:Схема и ИМФ в случае России была:
1. Снизить инфляцию.
2. Сбалансировать бюджет.
3. Провести банковские и юридические реформы.
Правительство Елцина выполняло только #1. #2 и #3 Дума не хотела делать и Елцин не хотел давить на Думу.
DanielMa wrote:siharry wrote:Хождение доллара можно было бы ограничить элементарно, если для этого была бы политическая воля.
Ну не томите, расскажите какие конкретно шаги надо было предпринять?
Никто не запрещает расплачиваться на территории США любыми деньгами. Просто никто не обязывает других брать ничего кроме долларов вот они и не берут.
Трава знатная. 
siharry wrote:
Жалко что Вы сути не понимаете. МВФ - это монетаристы по Фридману.
Из кризисов никогда эта политика не выводила, а наоборот усугубляла.
Почитайте про Кейнса, тогда поймете о чем я говорю.
Вы считаете правительство США последними идиотами? Самый верный способ минимизировать налоги - расплатится за что-либо чужими тугриками по заниженному(завышенному) курсу.
IMF Press Release wrote:
Joint Communiqué
of the Chairman of the Russian Federation
and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
February 19, 1998
The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, visited Moscow on February 17-19, 1998 at the invitation of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, to discuss the economic policy program for 1998 pursued by the Government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the context of the medium-term economic strategy supported by the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) covering 1996-98. The Prime Minister and the Managing Director share a common assessment of the situation, of the strategy, and the policies needed to bring the program to a full success given the prevailing challenges in the international financial environment.
The Prime Minister and the Managing Director expressed satisfaction that their respective negotiating teams have just finalized understandings on the policy parameters and measures to be incorporated in the 1998 program. These understandings are specified in a draft Statement of Economic Policies which will be published once it has been signed by the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia and formally approved by IMF management. Following the usual technical procedures, it is expected that the Statement will be signed within the next couple of weeks.
The visit has allowed the Russian authorities and the Managing Director to take stock of what has already been accomplished during the first two years under the EFF. They agreed that, notwithstanding substantial achievements in the areas of macroeconomic stabilization and the establishment of market mechanisms and institutions, a number of remaining challenges require decisive action without delay. In particular, structural reform--notably promoting the principles of good corporate governance--should be deepened and the fiscal imbalances addressed. The 1998 program is designed to take into account the recent international financial market turmoil that has led to a sharp deterioration in the economic environment in which the Russian economy has not been entirely spared.
Recognizing that fiscal imbalances have been a source of recent financial market uncertainties, the Government has proposed some key amendments to bring the 1998 budget in line with realistic revenue projections. Forceful efforts will continue to be taken to improve revenue performance, and taxes will not be collected through offset arrangements. At the same time, comprehensive efforts will be made to cut federal government spending; the completion of the new operational Treasury system should establish the control necessary to ensure that the budget appropriations can be fully financed without arrears while reducing the deficit further. The EFF program for 1998 is fully consistent with the draft 1998 budget as amended by the Government. Furthermore, in pursuit of the prime objective of laying the basis for growth, the program also envisages a strengthening of structural reforms in areas such as private sector development, fiscal institutions, banking, and natural monopolies.
The Managing Director also met with President Yeltsin who confirmed his strong support for the 1998 program of the Government and Central Bank of the Russian Federation, as was clearly shown in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on February 17. In view of the tasks that remain to be accomplished, the Prime Minister and the Managing Director agreed to propose an extension of the EFF by an additional year through early 2000. In this context, an augmentation of the size of the IMF's financial support under the program and a revised quarterly disbursement schedule was agreed. In concluding the negotiations, the Managing Director was confident that fulfillment of the policies under the program would result in Russia's successful transition to a dynamic market economy.
CTAC_P wrote:Daniel,
и к чему это? Кризис, кстати, тоже бабахнул в феврале.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE MELTDOWN
Russia's stock market had performed spectacularly well, rising 150 percent during the period June 1996-June 1997. In the fall of 1997, however, the Asian economic flu caused a bout of pneumonia on the Russian stock exchange. Moscow's financial markets went into a tailspin, and foreign investors began to withdraw. The poor economic situation in Russia was exacerbated by falling oil prices (oil and gas are responsible for up to 75 percent of Russia's foreign currency earnings); a government deficit in excess of 7 percent of the GDP; a punitively high tax rate combined with an inefficient and ineffective tax collection system; and crime, corruption, and crony capitalism.
The situation deteriorated in late May 1998. The economy almost collapsed on May 27, when foreign and domestic investors panicked and began to sell government bonds, corporate stocks, and rubles. In a desperate attempt to defend the ruble and offset the mass exodus of foreign investors, the Russian Central Bank hiked the interest rates on government bonds to an astronomical 200 percent per year and expended large amounts of Russia's foreign exchange reserves in purchasing rubles. To support the ruble, the Central Bank sold $1 billion in one day, causing its hard currency reserves to dwindle to $14 billion. It became obvious that the Central Bank could not support the currency forever and that it was only a matter of time until the government had to borrow even more funds to support the ruble.
Some economists, such as Andrei Illarionov, the Director of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis, 3 predicted the ruble's devaluation and called for measures to manage this inevitable development in an orderly fashion. They were not heeded. 4 Instead, then-Prime Minister Kirienko called upon former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais to negotiate yet another bailout package with the IMF.
Several factors contributed to the drop in foreign investor confidence in the spring and early summer of 1998. The communist-dominated State Duma passed legislation prohibiting foreign ownership of more than 25 percent of the stock of Unified Energy Systems (UES), the national electrical monopoly, at a time when foreign ownership already was over 28 percent. Foreign investors also became jittery when a huge government-owned oil company with oil reserves worth tens of billions of dollars that was slated to be privatized failed to attract any buyers at the asking price of $2.1 billion.
Oil prices dropped approximately 30 percent between 1997 and 1998, severely decreasing the earnings of Russia-based companies as well as government receipts. Investors also began to take serious notice of the rampant corruption and nepotism in Russia. For example, highly lucrative short-term government bonds (the so-called GKOs) were snapped up by several well-connected Russian banks, while the broad masses of Russians had no opportunity to purchase them.
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
Both Russia and the IMF are responsible for the Russian debacle. Russia's fault lies in the government's chronic refusal to reform. The Russian government has been aware of the problems in its economy and what is needed to fix them for at least five years. Because of mismanagement, inertia, and outright corruption, such vital changes as trimming the budget, overhauling the tax code and tax collection, land reform, and otherwise providing conditions to stem capital flight and attract foreign investment have not been implemented.
The fault of the IMF lies in its willingness to provide successive bailouts regardless of whether they achieve the desired results. When asked at a July 13 press conference whether the IMF would refrain from new lending because of reduced liquidity, IMF Treasurer David Williams responded, "[W]e never say no."
Russia is a prime example of how this can lead to disastrous results. Since 1992 (and before the most recent $22.6 billion bailout), the IMF lent Russia over $18 billion. With each loan, the IMF required Russia to adopt economic reforms. Even though Moscow rarely fulfilled its promises, the IMF continued to disperse tranche after tranche. In other words, the cheap credits allowed Russia to delay reforms, while the IMF rewarded Moscow for not reforming.
This pattern is being repeated in the current bailout. Despite the devaluation of the ruble and the Duma's refusal to pass the majority of IMF-mandated reforms, Michel Camdessus' August 17 statement merely remarked that
[Russia's] measures and their potential impact will immediately be analyzed by the staff and management of the IMF.... I hope that the government's economic program will continue to be implemented in full, so that the economic and financial situation will improve and the IMF can be in a position to disburse the second tranche....
THE CAUSES OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC FAILURE
The causes for pessimism about Russia run deep. The country's economic woes are the result of 74 years of communist mismanagement and almost eight years of half-hearted reforms under the post-communist regime. A number of interconnected problems combined to generate the current systemic failure of the Russian economy.
The first problem Russia faces is fiscal and budgetary. The country has been running up large budget deficits (7.5 percent of the GDP). It has a complex, punitive, and arbitrary tax system. To make matters worse, the tax collection system is failing; it is mismanaged, corruption is rampant, and the tax base is extremely narrow.
The second problem is structural. Russia's GDP has declined for six years since 1992, and the country has yet to experience meaningful economic growth in the post-communist era. Its industrial base is obsolete; it is not uncommon to find machinery in Russian factories dating as far back as the 1920s, while equipment from the 1970s is considered modern. Russian finished goods are of such low quality that they often are not competitive in the domestic market, let alone on the global scene.
The third problem is the lack of bank financing and venture capital needed for economic growth. With property rights insecure, and operations with government bonds and hard currency extremely lucrative, the Russian banks have invested little in industry
The fourth problem is the lack of governance and management expertise necessary to run a modern market economy and a democratic society.
The fifth problem is the lack of a functioning legal system and mechanism to enforce dispute resolution. The legal system is still unfinished; the judges are undertrained and often incompetent; the court system is corrupt.
The courts, moreover, lack the support structures to enforce their decisions and collect fines. Filling the vacuum left by the state, organized crime has come to play a major role in commercial dispute resolution and the enforcement of court rulings. Again, this was an important cause for the low level of foreign and domestic investment, as well as being a contributing factor in capital flight.
Finally, there is the issue of the business culture and the lack of a business ethic.
DanielMa wrote:CTAC_P wrote:Daniel,
и к чему это? Кризис, кстати, тоже бабахнул в феврале.
A я думал в августе. Это просто показывает политику ИМФ по отношению к России.
Granderator NIKOFF wrote:МВФ никому не нужен
The hope in Nairobi (Kenia) is that the IMF will announce the release of $200m (&123m) in funds, as part of a three year programme, in September. .
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) says it has reached agreement with Argentina's new president to start negotiations for a three-year debt relief programme to the country over the coming weeks
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced that it will provide Bangladesh with nearly $500m under a three-year poverty reduction programme for the country..
Economists from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have ended their latest visit to Uruguay on a high note, government officials said.
. Ведь в данном случае, это еще больше может затянуть дефляционный кризис в Северной Америке.
МВФ все еще пытается схватиться за соломинку.
India is joining the ranks of countries who contribute to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) reserve for bailing out poor nations in financial trouble...India allotted 205m Special Drawing Rights - the IMF's currency - or almost $300m (&182m) to the IMF in two transfers in May and June.
DanielMa wrote:Ну на то он и Monetary Fund чтобы быть монетаристами. Не вижу в этом ничего плохого.
DanielMa wrote:
Вы считаете правительство США последними идиотами? Самый верный способ минимизировать налоги - расплатится за что-либо чужими тугриками по заниженному(завышенному) курсу.
Найдите мне закон где написано что этого нельзя делать?
siharry wrote:DanielMa wrote:
Вы считаете правительство США последними идиотами? Самый верный способ минимизировать налоги - расплатится за что-либо чужими тугриками по заниженному(завышенному) курсу.
Найдите мне закон где написано что этого нельзя делать?
Найдите закон, который не разрешает Вам таким образом уходить от налогов. Вы у нас юрист, Вам закон проще найти...
DanielMa wrote:
1) Нет закона который запрещает например принимать Российские рубли в Теnnessee. При заполнении налоговых деклараций все доходы переводяться в доллары. Чего вы мне тут пытаетесь доказать?
2) И какую политическую волю вы предлагали применить в России чтобы избавиться от доллара?
Обложить 10% налогом - да попросить ЦБ, чтоб слил несколько миллиардов на рынок. Двух недель хватит, чтобы долларов в России у населения стало меньше в разы 
Айсберг wrote:1) И кто в таком случае будет котировать рубль?
2) Да элементарно.
И ведь запрещать ничего не надо - монетаризьм
DanielMa wrote:
1) Spot rate на бирже которая торгует рублями. Как она там называетьсям ММВБ?2) Да элементарно.
И ведь запрещать ничего не надо - монетаризьм
2) Обложить чего налогом? И чего слить на рынок?
Для усиления эффекта - слить на внутренний рынок пару-тройку миллиардов баксов, протухающих в запасниках ЦБ. Когда курс рубля дойдет до 20 - баксов у населения уже не будет Да только нахрена так его кидать, население-то? Пусть себе по-тихоньку умнеет, а умнея - само освобождается от этой макулатуры Айсберг wrote:2) Да элементарно.
Айсберг wrote:1) То есть, признать рубль свободноконвертируемым на государственном уровне?
2) Обложить налогом - сам доллар, как товар иностранного государства. Иначе говоря - ввести на него импортную пошлину.
M_K wrote:Достаточно просто прекратить эту порочную практику с у.е. Т.е., например, рассматривать цены в у.е. как финансовое нарушение. В разного рода договорах фиксировать цены также в только в рублях.
.
Айсберг wrote:2) Обложить налогом - сам доллар, как товар иностранного государства. Иначе говоря - ввести на него импортную пошлину.
M_K wrote:Достаточно просто прекратить эту порочную практику с у.е. Т.е., например, рассматривать цены в у.е. как финансовое нарушение.
DanielMa wrote:Хорошая идея. И зарплату тоже надо запретить деноминировать в долларах и давать в конвертах.
CTAC_P wrote:Тем более что закон такой есть. Закон о защите прав потребителей требует указывать цену так, чтобы потребителю не требовалось специальных знаний для вычисления цены. Например, показывать цену без налога с продаж внутри - нарушение.
M_K wrote:Да я знаю. Только это полумера. Я имел ввиду - вообще все. Т.е., недвижимость, разные там автослоны импортные, всякие договора. И любые упоминания где-либо каких-либо у.е. рассматривать как фин. нарушение.
Финансовые риски импортных поставок, например, можно было бы страховать.
DanielMa wrote:Позвоните депутату из вашего округа и посоветуйте ему протолкнуть это закон в Думе.
DanielMa wrote:Позвоните депутату из вашего округа и посоветуйте ему протолкнуть это закон в Думе.
M_K wrote:DanielMa wrote:Позвоните депутату из вашего округа и посоветуйте ему протолкнуть это закон в Думе.
Я бы тоже мог найти для вас массу полезных занятий, вместо того, чтобы флудить на privet-е.