Privet wrote:[Я опасаюсь (опять употребляю это слово
), что реалии таковы, что у населения мало пока механизмов воздействия на власть и политичесая активность населения мала.
В России власть всегда боялась народного бунта. Как говориться, "русский долго запрягает, но быстро едет." Putin was disturbed when his popularity declined as a result of mishandling "Kursk" submarine accident. After unfavorable Kursk news coverage he cracked down on independent press because he was afraid of losing popular support. After recent popular unrest resulting from cutting subsidies to the poor families Putin was forced to re-shuffle the government. So severe popular dissatisfaction is probably an working feedback mechanism today. Crude, but sometimes effective once it gets going.
Privet wrote: Чтобы люди изменились, нужно чтобы прошло какое-то время и люди удовлетворили свои первые потребности и перестали создавать запасы продуктов первой необходимости. Тогда они начнут думать о дне завтрашнем.
I agree. It may take 1-2 new generations. Further, political brainwashing was (and still is) way too strong to recover from that easily and quickly.
Privet wrote:Демократия нужна, но она вряд ли реализуема. Тоталитарная власть позволяет сохранить страну, но отодвигает на дальний план построение элементов демократии.
Chinese version may work if implemented well. First, professionally manage economic transition, then start introducing democracy step-by-step. China put together their plan after carefully analyzing Soviet Union collapse. Plus fight corruption. Not easy, but China made that work.
Privet wrote:Я бы не преувеличивал роль ФСБ. Такого контроля, как при СССР сейчас нет. Да и не нужна она в таком объёме, т.к. многие задачи решаются другими методами. Ведь СМИ всё равно под относительном контроле. Во всяком случае, президент имеет достаточную долю в информационном пространстве.
Контроль бизнeса? Не знаю. Поделитесь информацией, если Вы что-то знаете?
The means have changed, but FSB controls the country strongly enough today through the following means:
1. 70% of big Russian businesses are controlled by FSB people explicitly or implicitly. That is a very powerfull leverage.
Even small and medium-size businesses who need "krysha" (and most of them need it) try to enlist FSB protection as the safest one (and pay for it, naturally).
2. Large percentage of key political and business appointees made by Putin were former FSB officers from St Petersburg.
3. FSB people used to be generally loyal to each other (althogh that starts to change) and have shared mentality. Just like Britain government used to be dominated by Eaton graduates, and US big businesses by Harvard people, Russia today is under the influence of FSB through economic and political means.
That is unfortunate, because in Soviet times FSB was a tool to enforce policies, not to make policies. They are trained to control but not to govern. They did enforce relative security after Eltsin's era, which perhaps was not so bad, as the country was sliding into chaos. But the side effects are too expensive. Now they need to step aside gradually, but they do not want to -- now it's mostly about money and power.
KLM77 wrote:Putin will appoint another FSB guy from St Petersburg to run the country but will try to retain as much control as possible.
Privet wrote: На чём основывается Ваша уверенность? Приведите хотя бы один довод.
People have patterns of behavior. Most of Putin's key appointees have been FSB people from St Petersburg. I expect that pattern to continue because it worked for him in the past.
On the issue of why he does not choose a successor faster:
There was a good article in Moscow Times about that recently. Moscow Times said that the information came from their government and FSB sources. It said roughly the following:
There are two competing fractions in his administration: one lead by Igor Sechin, one led by Cherkesov. There was a recent shootout between 2 different FSB fractions that stand behind Sechin and Cherkesov correspondingly. Cherkesov gave an interview about that to Kommersant, and Putin expressed his strong dissatisfaction with that interview (along the lines "iz izby sor ne vynosyat").
If Putin endorses a successor now, he will immediatelly become less relevant and he does not want that. So for now he plays those 2 groups (Sechin and Cherkesov) against each other as a way to keep his independence, and delays appointing a successor. If he endorses one group, he would become dependent on them.