http://www.darwinspredictions.com/
by Cornelius G. Hunter (PhD in Biophysics and Computational Biology)
The difference between these two examples is not so much in whether there were falsifications but in how the falsifications were accommodated. Both classical physics and geocentrism had their falsifications. But classical physics was understood to have limited domain of applicability whereas geocentrism became tremendously complex—to the point of seeming to be more of an exercise in fitting the data rather than explaining nature. One can always fit the data if one is willing to employ heroic mechanisms and explanations. [4]
This brings us to the issue of simplicity, or parsimony, in scientific theories. It has long been understood that elaborate explanations can always be contrived in order to explain observations. But why should we believe they are true? The backward motion of planets can be explained by a series of epicycles, designed specifically to fit the peculiar motion. But with heliocentrism no such adjustments are required—the backward planetary motion is a natural outcome.
So while complicated narratives are needed for bed-time stories and soap operas, parsimony is valued in science. Nature, and only nature, should be explained. Scientists become suspicious when a theory becomes increasingly complex to accommodate failed expectations—when particular explanations are needed to adjust to contradictory findings.
Falsifications can also be a sign of problems if they are common. If a theory makes predictions that are consistently wrong, then suspicion again arises. Regardless of how much complexity is needed to explain the contradictory findings, a steady stream of such findings, in itself, can indicate weakness.
Evolution has a long history of false predictions leading to rising complexity. The evolutionist’s claim that all of this is a sign of good science, of learning how evolution actually occurred, is not consistent with evolution’s many falsified predictions and complex adjustments. This document summarizes a representative set of such falsifications, including the reactions of evolutionists showing how the contradictory findings were accommodated, and concludes with an examination of why evolutionists believe their theory is a fact and what this tells us about the theory.
In the century and a half since Charles Darwin proposed his theory of evolution, science has discovered a plethora of contradictory information. Many predictions of the theory have been falsified, including foundational expectations. The theory has consistently failed and as a consequence it has grown far more complex than anything Darwin ever envisioned. Evolution is not a good scientific theory and in this sense it is comparable to geocentrism. Both theories grew ever more complicated in response to the evidences of the natural world, adding epicycle upon epicycle.
In stark contrast to these evidential problems, evolutionists believe that their theory is a fact. Evolution is a fact, they say, just as gravity is fact. This remarkable claim is an indicator that there is more to evolution than merely a scientific theory. In light of the scientific evidence, the claim that evolution is a fact may seem to be absurd. But it is not.
The fact of evolution is a necessary consequence of the metaphysical assumptions evolutionists make. Metaphysical assumptions are assumptions that do not derive from science. They are made independent of science. These metaphysical assumptions that evolutionists make would be difficult to defend as necessarily true outside of evolutionary circles, but within evolution their truth is not controversial. All of this means that the scientific problems with evolution are relegated to questions of how evolution occurred. The science cannot bear on questions of whether or not evolution occurred
