Выдержки:
For the world as a whole, Kyoto abatement benefits overtake costs by 2100 and increasingly exceed them thereafter. It is the industrial countries who pay, however. Considering that their benefits as a percent of GDP are the same curve as shown globally in figure 12, for the industrial countries Kyoto benefits only overtake costs by about 2200. On this basis, the resistance of some industrial countries to the Kyoto approach is understandable.
An important qualification to this estimate is that the benefit-cost calculus might be favorable for Europe as a subregion within the industrial country group. Because the risk of thermohaline circulation shutdown poses the greatest potential damage to Europe, in their regional RICE model Nordhaus and Boyer (2000, p. 160) find that Kyoto emissions ceilings would have a net positive benefit for Europe even in an arrangement in which emissions trading is only allowed within the OECD. This version has significant losses for the United States and for the world as a whole, however.
Quite apart from the unattractive cost benefit calculation from the standpoint of industrial countries as a group, as noted the Kyoto Protocol accomplishes relatively little in curbing warming. For the world as a whole, then, it is better than nothing, but not a persuasive answer to the problem of global warming. For industrial countries, its economic costs outweigh its economic benefits.
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/home ... 102599.pdf
Выдержки:
Many readers have expressed surprise about the small impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the damages from global warming. The reasons are that, because there is so much inertia in the climate system and because the Protocol does not limit the emissions of developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol reduces the global temperature increase by only a fraction of a degree over the next century.
We conclude our analysis with three observations. First, we find that the strategy behind the Kyoto Protocol has no grounding in economics or environmental policy. The approach of freezing emissions at a given level for a group of countries is not related to a particular goal for concentrations, temperature, or damages. Nor does it bear any relation to an economically oriented strategy that would balance the costs and benefits of greenhouse-gas reductions.
However, the benefit-cost ratio of the Annex I [ed:current version] version is 0.44, while the ratio for the no trade version is 0.18. Moreover, these estimates are based on the optimistic assumption that policies are efficiently implemented. The differences among implementation strategies emphasize the point that efficient design of the policy should be a major concern of policymakers.
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol has significant distributional consequences. Annex I countries pay the costs of Protocol. These costs will come either through abatement activities or through purchase of permits. The lion’s share of these costs are borne by the United States — indeed, the U.S. is a net loser while the rest of the world on balances benefits from the Kyoto Protocol.
В общем интересное чтение. Кто-то явно США хотел подложить (и подложил) большую свинью, составляя эти "протоколы Киотских мудрецов". Неудивительно что Сенат проголосовал 95-0 против, даже самые-самые либералы.
-- т.е. такого потепления за последние много тысяч лет не было (возраст рифов).
