varenuha wrote:PavelM wrote:В третьих, компиляция публично доступной информации действительно может наносить ущерб.
Ну-ка, ну-ка. Предположим, есть опубликованная, не содержащая секретов, информация. Каким образом, можно, ее перекомпилировав, превратить в секретную?
1
Information that is unclassified per se can be classified when it is associated with certain other information (e.g., materials or components that are unclassified per se may be classified when associated with a classified project or hardware item). This chapter's discussion about classification of compiled information assumes that there is no association of information within the compilations that would make the compilations classified.
к примеру
[b]The Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance[/b] wrote:Unclassified off-the-shelf items, unless modified in some particular way to make them perform differently, can never be classified even though they constitute a critical element, become an integral part of a classified end product, or produce a properly classified effect. However, the association of otherwise unclassified hardware with a particular effort or product may reveal something classified about that effort or product.
Thus, a commercially available item of hardware by itself can never be classified, but its association with a classified project may cause that hardware to be classified when it is associated with that project.5 For example, shipment of a hardware item to a defense contractor whose only product is one classified hardware subsystem may cause the fact of shipment to be classified if the item would reveal classified information about the subsystem.
A chemical or other material may be unclassified per se but when it is associated with a classified process or project such that the association indicates a classified use of that chemical or material, then the association is classified.
In some instances, the presence of a certain individual's name on the distribution list of an otherwise unclassified document may cause that document to be classified. For example, if the name of the manager of a classified project appears on a report's distribution list and if the association of the subject-matter of the report with the classified project is classified, then the report should be classified if the appearance of the manager's name on the distribution list indicates that the subject of the report is of interest to the classified project.
Classification by association is sometimes a reason why the United States does not declassify information that has been published in another nation. For example, the information may have a national security use which the adversaries have not yet discovered. If the originating U.S. program published that information, then the information would be linked to that program and could reveal the information's national security use. This problem could be avoided if the U.S. information were published by someone not connected with the program that developed the information. An example has been cited whereby a document was written by one person and published, unclassified, under the name of another person because the document would have been classified if issued by the true author. However, when the national security use of an item of information is reasonably obvious, then the information should not be disclosed even when disassociated from the originating program.9 For example, structural materials that are suitable for containing liquid uranium in foundry work are also suitable for containing liquid uranium in other applications. If the use in other applications is classified, then the use in foundry work should be classified.
In recent years, sites on which classified federal facilities are located have been subject to increased oversight of current activities and extensive review of past activities, especially with respect to releases of chemicals to the environment. Such reviews have been, and are being, carried out by other federal agencies, by state regulatory agencies, and by special investigating teams. Frequently the reviewing groups request "raw" data which identify all chemicals (and perhaps their concentrations) detected in atmospheric releases, liquid effluent, groundwater samples, and soil samples with respect to specific facilities or locations within a site, at the site boundary, or in the vicinity of a site. Some site activities may have involved, or currently involve, the use of materials that are per se unclassified but are classified when associated with a site or a specific facility at that site (e.g., a classified burial ground or a building housing a classified manufacturing process). Therefore, such raw monitoring data must be carefully examined before it is released as unclassified to determine whether the data reveal patterns or trends that could link a specific chemical to a classified use.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist2/chap_9.html
2
Compilation is defined as an orderly arrangement of preexisting materials (facts, statistics, etc.) gathered from many sources into one document.
(1) compilations that have had no substantive value (information) added by the compiler (contains only information present in the individual items of information that constitute the compilation)
(2) compilations to which substantive value has been added by the compiler (contains substantive information added by the compiler [e.g., the compiler used expert judgment to select certain information for the compilation, or the compiler added new substantive information (e.g., critical comments) to available information]).
Classification of Compilations with Substantive Value Added
If a compiler has added some information of substantive value to a compilation of unclassified information, then the resulting compilation should be classified (1) if the added information is considered to be classified per se, (2) if the added information is classified because of association with the preexisting information, or (3) if the preexisting information is classified when associated with the added information. This is not a new rule proposed for the classification of compilations of unclassified information with substantive value added. Rather, it is a principle by which all documents are evaluated to determine the security classification of the information contained therein.
например... как компиляция незасекреченных источников стала секретным материалом...
[b]Judicial Decisions on Classification of Compilations[/b] wrote:A 1978 Federal District Court case involved a request for the release of a compilation of the number and exact titles of National Security Study Memoranda and National Security Decisional Memoranda issued between January 20, 1969, and the date of the request. The National Security Council (NSC) compiled that information but then refused to release this compilation because it contained classified information (i.e., the compilation included classified and unclassified titles and also gave the chronological sequence in which the individual reports were produced). The requester then asked for a compilation of the unclassified titles, and the NSC again refused to release the requested information. The staff secretary of the NSC submitted an affidavit stating that "access to the unclassified titles in their totality would . . . enable a foreign intelligence analyst to identify the kinds of issues of grave concern to the United States and the way in which this government reacts to world events, and also to gain unique insights into the method by which issues of this kind are identified, studied and resolved by the President." Government affidavits also stated that the compilation would provide other nations "with valuable information and insight pertaining to the focus and timing of key U.S. foreign policy concerns." The court determined that the list was "reasonably classified in full, unclassified titles included," and exempted the list from release. The sequential nature of the titles on the lists may have been a major factor in the decision, since the court said that "this decision is, however, without prejudice to any future claim by plaintiff for access to any unclassified documents now in existence, or any unclassified documents that may come into existence, which list the unclassified titles . . . in `scrambled' sequence and in edited form . . . ."
Although the titles to the reports in the compilation were unclassified, the compiler had listed those titles in chronological order and had included the dates when the reports were prepared. The court was of the opinion that those dates added substantive information (value) to the compilation, particularly with respect to intelligence considerations. The court therefore upheld the agency's determination that the compilation should be a classified document. This outcome is consistent with the general rule that compilations of unclassified information should be classified if no substantive value is added by the compiler.
угадайте, что стало бы с человеком, поделись он этой компиляцией (добытой полностью из открытых источников) с советской разведкой
ну и так далее... почитайте если интересно
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist2/chap_10.html
